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PART Ⅰ CONCERNING GOD 1

DEFINITIONS 1

Ⅰ．Cause of Itself (causa sui) 1

Ⅱ．Finite in its Kind (in suo genere finita) 1

Ⅲ．Substance (substantia) 1

Ⅳ．Attribute (attributum) 1

Ⅴ．Mode (modus) 1

Ⅵ．God (Deus) 1

Ⅶ．The thing is said to be Free (libera)，Necessary (necessaria)，or Compelled (coacta) 2

Ⅷ．Eternity (oeternitas) 2

AXIOMS Ⅰ．-Ⅶ 2

PROPOSITIONS 3

Ⅰ．A substance is prior in its nature to Its modifications 3

Ⅱ．Two substances，having different attributes，have nothing in common between them 3

Ⅲ．Of two things having nothing in common between them，one cannot be the cause of the other 3

Ⅳ．Two or three distinct things are distinguished one from the other either by the difference of the attributes of the substances or by the difference of their modifications 3

Ⅴ．In the nature of things，two or more things may not be granted having the same nature or attribute 3

Ⅵ．One substance cannot be produced by another Corollary 4

Ⅶ．Existence appertains to the nature of substance 4

Ⅷ．All substance is necessarily infinite 4

Notes 5

Ⅸ．The more reality or being a thing has，the more attributes will it have 7

Ⅹ．Each attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself 7

Note 7

Ⅺ．God or a substance consisting of infinite attributes，each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence，necessarily exists 7

Note 9

Ⅻ．No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived，from which it would follow that substance can be divided into parts 10

ⅩⅢ．Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible Corollary 10

Note 10

ⅩⅣ．Except God no substance can be granted or conceived Corollaries 11

ⅩⅤ．Whatever is，is in God，and nothing can exist or be conceived without God 11

Note 11

ⅩⅥ．Infinite things in infinite modes (that is，all things which can fall under the heading of infinite intellect) must necessarily follow from the necessity of divine nature 15

Corollaries 15

ⅩⅦ．God acts merely according to his own laws，and is compelled by no one 15

Corollaries 15

Note 16

ⅩⅧ．God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things 18

ⅩⅨ．God and all the attributes of God are eternal 18

Note 18

ⅩⅩ．God＇s existence and his essence are one and the same thing 19

Corollaries 19

ⅩⅪ．All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must exist for ever and infinitely，or must exist eternally and infinitely through that same attribute 19

ⅩⅫ．Whatever follows from an attribute of God，in so far as it is modified by such a modification as exists of necessity and infinitely through the same，must also exist of necessity and infinitely 20

ⅩⅩⅢ．Every mode which of necessity and infinitely exists must of necessity have followed either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God，or from some attribute modified by a modification which exists of necessity and infinitely 20

ⅩⅩⅣ．The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence 21

Corollary 21

ⅩⅩⅤ．God is not only the effecting cause of the existence of things，but also of their essence 21

Note 21

Corollary 21

ⅩⅩⅥ．A thing which is determined for the performing of anything was so determined necessarily by God，and a thing which is not determined by God cannot deter mine of itself to do anything 21

ⅩⅩⅦ．A thing which is determined by God for the per forming of anything cannot render itself undetermined 22

ⅩⅩⅧ．Every individual thing，or whatever thing that is finite and has a determined existence，cannot exist nor be determined for action unles it is determined for action and existence by another cause which is also finite and has a determined existence；and again，this cause also cannot exist nor be determined for action unless it be determined for existence and action by another cause which also is finite and has a determined existence：and so on to infinity 22

Note 23

ⅩⅩⅨ．In the nature of things nothing contingent (contingens) is granted，but all things are determined by the necessity of divine nature for existing and working in a certain way 23

Note 24

ⅩⅩⅩ．Intellect，finite or infinite in actuality (actus)，must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God and nothing else 24

ⅩⅩⅪ．The intellect in action，whether it be finite or infinite，as will，desire，love，etc．，must be referred not to active but passive nature 24

Note 25

ⅩⅩⅫ．Will can only be called a necessary cause，not a free one 25

Corollaries 25

ⅩⅩⅩⅢ．Things could not have been produced by God in any other manner or order than that in which they were produced 26

Notes 26

ⅩⅩⅩⅣ．The power of God is the same as his essence 29

ⅩⅩⅩⅤ．Whatever we conceive to be in the power of God necessarily exists 29

ⅩⅩⅩⅥ．Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow 29

APPENDIX 30

PART Ⅱ CONCERNING THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 37

PREFACE 37

DEFINITIONS 37

Ⅰ．Body (corpus) 37

Ⅱ．That which appertains to the essence of a thing 37

Ⅲ．Idea (idea) 37

Ⅳ．Adequate Idea (idea adcequata) 37

Ⅴ．Duration (duratio) 38

Ⅵ．Reality and Perfection (realitas et perfedio) 38

Ⅶ．Individual Things (res singulares) 38

AXIOMS Ⅰ．-Ⅴ． 38

PROPOSITIONS 38

Ⅰ．Thought (cogitatio) is an attribute of God，or God is a thinking thing 38

Note 39

Ⅱ．Extension (extensio) is an attribute of God，or God is an extended thing 39

Ⅲ．In God there is granted not only the idea of his essence，but also the idea of all the things which follow necessarily from his essence 39

Note 39

Ⅳ．The idea of God from which infinite things in infinite modes follow can only be one 40

Ⅴ．The formal being of ideas acknowledges God as its cause only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing，and not in so far as he is revealed in some other attribute：that is，the ideas，not only of the attributes of God，but also of individual things，do not acknowledge their ideals or the objects perceived as their effecting cause，but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing 40

Ⅵ．The modes of any attribute of God have God for their cause only in so far as he is considered through that attribute，and not in so far as he is considered through any other attribute 41

Corollary 41

Ⅶ．The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things 41

Corollary 41

Note 41

Ⅷ．The ideas of individual things or modes which do not exist must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God in the same way as the formal essences of individual things or modes are contained in the attributes of God 42

Corollary 42

Note 43

Ⅸ．The idea of an individual thing actually existing has God for its cause，not in so far as he is infinite，but in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of another individual thing actually existing of which also God is the cause，in so far as he is affected by another third idea，and so on to infinity 43

Corollary 44

Ⅹ．The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man，or，again，substance does not constitute the form (forma) of man 44

Notes 44

Corollary 44

Ⅺ．The first part which constitutes the actual being of the human mind is nothing else than the idea of an individual thing actually existing 45

Corollary 46

Note 46

Ⅻ．Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind must be perceived by the human mind，or the idea of that thing must necessarily be found in the human mind：that is，if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be the body，nothing can happen in that body which is not perceived by the mind 46

Note 47

ⅩⅢ．The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body，or a certain mode of extension actually existing and nothing else 47

Corollary 47

Note 47

AXIOMS Ⅰ．，Ⅱ 48

LEMMAS Ⅰ．-Ⅲ． 48

Corollary 49

AXIOMS Ⅰ．-Ⅲ． 50

LEMMAS Ⅳ．-Ⅶ． 50

Note 51

POSTULATES Ⅰ．-Ⅵ． 52

ⅩⅣ．The human mind is apt to perceive many things，and more so according as its body can be disposed in more ways 52

ⅩⅤ．The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple，but composed of many ideas 53

ⅩⅥ．The idea of every mode in which the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body and at the same time the nature of the external body 53

Corollaries 53

ⅩⅦ．If the human body is affected in a mode which involves the nature of any external body，the human mind regards that external body as actually existing，or as present to itself until the body is affected by a modification which cuts off the existence or presence of that body 53

Corollary 54

Note 54

ⅩⅧ．If the human body has once been affected at the same time by two or more bodies，when the mind after wards remembers any one of them it will straightway remember the others 55

Note 55

ⅩⅨ．The human mind has no knowledge of the human body，nor does it know it to exist save through ideas of modifications by which the body is affected 56

ⅩⅩ．The idea or knowledge of the human mind is granted in God and follows in God in the same manner，and is referred to God in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the human body 57

ⅩⅪ．This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same manner as the mind is united to the body 57

Note 58

ⅩⅫ．The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body，but also the ideas of these modifications 58

ⅩⅩⅢ．The mind has no knowledge of itself save in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body 58

ⅩⅩⅣ．The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the component parts of the human body 59

ⅩⅩⅤ．The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body 60

ⅩⅩⅥ．The human mind perceives no external body as actually existing save through ideas of modifications of its body 60

Corollary 60

ⅩⅩⅦ．The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human body itself 60

ⅩⅩⅧ．The ideas of the modifications of the human body，in so far as they are referred to the human mind alone，are not clear and distinct but confused 61

Note 61

ⅩⅩⅨ．The idea of the idea of each modification of the human mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the human mind 61

Corollary 62

Note 62

ⅩⅩⅩ．We can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body 62

ⅩⅩⅪ．We can only have a very Inadequate knowledge of individual things which are outside us 63

Corollary 63

ⅩⅩⅫ．All ideas，in so far as they have reference to God，are true 63

ⅩⅩⅩⅢ．There is nothing positive in ideas，wherefore they could be called false 63

ⅩⅩⅩⅣ．Every idea in us which is absolute，or adequate and perfect，is true 63

ⅩⅩⅩⅤ．Falsity consists in privation of knowledge which is involved by inadequate or mutilated and confused ideas 64

Note 64

ⅩⅩⅩⅥ．Inadequate and confused ideas follow from the same necessity as adequate or clear and distinct ideas 64

ⅩⅩⅩⅦ．That which is common to all，and that which is equally in a part and in the whole，do not constitute the essence of an individual thing 65

ⅩⅩⅩⅧ．Those things which are common to all，and which are equally in a part and in the whole，can only be conceived as adequate 65

Corollary 65

ⅩⅩⅩⅨ．That which is common to and a property of the human body，and certain external bodies by which the human body is used to be affected，and which is equally in the part and whole of these，has an adequate idea in the mind 66

Corollary 66

ⅩL．Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in the mind，are also adequate 66

Notes 66

ⅩLⅠ．Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity；knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true 69

ⅩLⅡ．Knowledge of the second and third kinds and not of the first kind teaches us to distinguish the true from the false 69

ⅩLⅢ．He who has a true idea，knows at that same time that he has a true idea，nor can he doubt concerning the truth of the thing 69

Note 70

ⅩLⅣ．It is not the nature of reason to regard things as contingent but necessary 71

Corollaries 71

Note 71

ⅩLⅤ．Every idea of every body or individual thing actually existing necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God 72

Note 73

ⅩLⅥ．The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which each idea involves is adequate and perfect 73

ⅩLⅦ．The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God 73

Note 74

ⅩLⅧ．There is in no mind absolute or free will，but the mind is determined for willing this or that by a cause which is determined in its turn by another cause，and this one again by another，and so on to infinity 74

Note 75

ⅩLⅨ．There Is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation save that which the idea，in so far as it is an idea，involves 75

Corollary 76

Note 76

PART Ⅲ CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS 83

DEFINITIONS 84

Ⅰ．Adequate Cause (adaquata causa)；Inadequate or Partial (inaiaquata sen partialis) 84

Ⅱ．Action and Passion 84

Ⅲ．Emotion (affectus) 84

POSTULATES Ⅰ．，Ⅱ． 85

PROPOSITIONS 85

Ⅰ．Our mind acts certain things and suffers others：namely，in so far as it has adequate ideas，thus far it necessarily acts certain things，and in so far as it has inadequate ideas，thus far it necessarily suffers certain things 85

Corollary 86

Ⅱ．The body cannot determine the mind to think，nor the mind the body to remain in motion，or at rest，or in any other state (if there be any other) 86

Note 86

Ⅲ．The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone，but passions depend on inadequate ideas alone 90

Note 90

Ⅳ．Nothing can be destroyed save by an external cause 90

Ⅴ．Things are contrary by nature，that is，they cannot exist in the same subject in so far as one can destroy the other 90

Ⅵ．Everything in so far as it is in itself endeavours to per sist in its own being 91

Ⅶ．The endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to per sist in its being is nothing else than the actual essence of that thing 91

Ⅷ．The endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to persist in its own being involves no finite time but an indefinite time 91

Ⅸ．The mind，in so far as it has both clear and distinct and confused ideas，endeavours to persist in its being for an indefinite period，and is conscious of this its endeavour 92

Note 92

Ⅹ．The idea which cuts off the existence of our body cannot be given in our mind，but is contrary thereto 92

Ⅺ．Whatever increases or diminishes，helps or hinders the power of action of our body，the idea thereof increases or diminishes，helps or hinders the power of thinking of our mind 93

Note 93

Ⅻ．The mind，as much as it can，endeavours to imagine those things which increase or help its power of acting． 94

ⅩⅢ．When the mind imagines things which diminish or hinder the power of acting of the body，it endeavours as much as it can to remember things which will cut off their existence 94

Corollary 5

Note 95

ⅩⅣ．If the mind were once affected at the same time by two emotions，when afterwards it is affected by one of them it will be also affected by the other 95

ⅩⅤ．Anything can accidentally be the cause of pleasure，pain，or desire 95

Corollary 96

Note 96

ⅩⅥ．From the fact alone that we imagine anything which has something similar to an object which is wont to affect the mind with pleasure or pain，although that in which the thing is similar to the object be not the effecting cause of those emotions，nevertheless we shall hate or love it accordingly 96

ⅩⅦ．If we imagine a thing which is wont to affect us with the emotion of sadness to have something similar to another thing which equally affects us with the emotion of pleasure，we will hate and love that thing at the same time 96

Note 97

ⅩⅧ．A man is affected with the same emotion of pleasure or pain from the image of a thing past or future as from the image of a thing present 97

Notes 98

ⅩⅨ．He will be saddened who Imagines that which he loves to be destroyed：if he imagines it to be preserved he is rejoiced 98

ⅩⅩ．He will be rejoiced who imagines what he hates to be destroyed 99

ⅩⅪ．He who imagines that which he loves to be affected by pleasure or pain，will also be affected by pleasure or pain：and these will be greater or less in the lover according as they are greater or less in the thing loved 99

ⅩⅫ．If we imagine anything to affect with pleasure what we love，we are affected with love towards it：and，on the other hand，if we imagine anything to affect it with pain，we are affected with hatred towards it 100

Note 100

ⅩⅩⅢ．He will be rejoiced who imagines that which he hates to be affected with pain；if，on the other hand，he imagines it to be affected with pleasure，he will be saddened：and these emotions will be greater or less according as the contrary emotions were greater or less in the things hated 100

Note 101

ⅩⅩⅣ．If we imagine any one to affect a thing we hate with pleasure，we are affected with hatred towards that person．If，on the other hand，we imagine him to affect it with pain，we are affected with love towards him 101

Note 101

ⅩⅩⅤ．We endeavour to affirm，concerning ourselves or what we love，everything that we imagine to affect what we love or ourselves with pleasure；and，on the other hand，we endeavour to deny，concerning ourselves and the object loved，everything that we imagine to affect us or the object loved with pain 101

ⅩⅩⅥ．We endeavour to affirm，concerning a thing that we hate，that which we imagine will affect it with pain，and，on the contrary，to deny all that which we imagine will affect it with pleasure 102

Note 102

ⅩⅩⅦ．By the fact that we imagine a thing which is like ourselves，and which we have not regarded with any emotion to be affected with any emotion，we also are affected with a like emotion 102

Notes 103

Corollaries 103

ⅩⅩⅧ．We endeavour to promote the being of everything that we imagine conducive to pleasure；but what we find repugnant or conducive to pain we endeavour to remove or destroy 103

ⅩⅩⅨ．We also shall endeavour to do everything which we imagine men to regard with pleasure，and，on the other hand，we shall be averse to doing what we imagine men to turn away from 104

Note 104

ⅩⅩⅩ．If any one has done anything which he imagines to affect others with pleasure，he will be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as the cause，or he will regard himself with pleasure．On the other hand，if he has done anything which he imagines to affect the others with pain，he regards himself then with pain 105

Note 105

ⅩⅩⅪ．If we imagine any one to love，desire，or hate anything which we ourselves love，hate，or desire，by that very fact we shall love，hate，or desire it the more．But，on the other hand，if we imagine that what we love is avoided by some one，then we undergo a wavering of the mind 105

Corollary 106

Note 106

ⅩⅩⅫ．If we imagine any one to enjoy anything which only one can possess，we shall endeavour to bring it to pass that he does not possess it 106

Note 106

ⅩⅩⅩⅢ．When we love a thing similar to ourselves，we endeavour as much as possible to bring it about that it also should love us 107

ⅩⅩⅩⅣ．The greater the emotion with which we imagine a thing loved to be affected towards us，the greater will be our vanity 107

ⅩⅩⅩⅤ．If any one imagines that the thing loved is joined to another than himself with the same or a faster bond of love than that which binds it to him，he will be affected with hatred towards the object loved，and envy towards the other 108

Note 108

ⅩⅩⅩⅥ．He who recollects a thing which he once enjoyed，desires to possess it under the same circumstances as those with which he first enjoyed it 109

Corollary 109

Note 109

ⅩⅩⅩⅦ．The desire which arises by reason of sadness，joy，hatred，or love，is greater according as the emotion is greater 109

ⅩⅩⅩⅧ．If any one begins to hate a thing loved so that his love for it is clearly laid aside，he will bear greater hatred towards it on that very account than if he had never loved it，and the more so according as his former love was greater 110

ⅩⅩⅩⅨ．He who hates any one will endeavour to do him harm unless he fears to receive a greater harm from him；and，on the other hand，he who loves some one will by the same law endeavour to do him good 110

Note 111

ⅩL．He who imagines himself to be hated by another，and believes that he has given the other no cause for hatred，will hate that person in return 111

Notes 112

Corollaries 112

ⅩLⅠ．If any one imagines himself to be loved by some one else，and does not believe that he has given any cause for this love，he shall love that person in return 113

Notes 113

Corollary 113

ⅩLⅡ．He who confers a benefit on any one moved by love，or by the hope of honour，will be saddened if he sees that the benefit is received with ingratitude 113

ⅩLⅢ．Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred，and，on the other hand，can be destroyed by love 114

ⅩLⅣ．Hatred which is entirely conquered by love passes into love，and love on that account is greater than if it had not been preceded by hatred 114

Note 114

ⅩLⅤ．If one imagines that any one similar to himself is affected with hatred towards another thing similar to himself whom he himself loves，then he will hate the first of these two 115

ⅩLⅥ．If any one has been affected with pleasure or pain by another person of a class or nation different to his own，and that accompanied by the idea of that person under the general name of that class or nation as the cause of the pleasure or pain，he will love or hate not only that person，but all of that class or nation 115

ⅩLⅦ．Joy which arises from the fact that we imagine a thing which we hate to be destroyed or affected by some evil never arises without some pain in us 115

Note 115

ⅩLⅧ．Love and hatred，for example，towards Peter，are destroyed，if the pain which the latter involves，and the pleasure which the former involves，are connected to the idea of another thing as a cause；and each of them will be diminished in so far as we imagine Peter not to be the only cause of either 116

ⅩLⅨ．Love or hatred towards a thing which we imagine to be free must be greater than the love or hatred towards a necessary thing，provided both are subject to the same cause 116

Note 117

L．Anything can be accidentally the cause of hope or fear 117

Note 117

LⅠ．Different men can be affected by one and the same object in different manners，and one and the same man can be affected by one and the same object in different ways at different times 117

Note 118

LⅡ．We cannot regard an object which we have seen before together with some others，or which we imagine to have nothing that is not common to many，as long as one which we imagine to have something singular about it 119

Note 119

LⅢ．When the mind regards itself and its power of acting it is rejoiced，and the more so the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting 120 Corollary 120

LⅣ．The mind endeavours to imagine those things only which impose its power of action on it 121

LⅤ．When the mind imagines its want of power it is saddened by that fact 121

Corollaries 121

Notes 121

LⅥ．There are as many species of pleasure，pain，desire，and consequently any emotion which is composed of these，such as wavering of the mind，or which is derived from these，such as love，fear，hope，hatred，etc．，as there are species of objects by which we are affected 123

Note 124

LⅦ．Any emotion of every individual differs from the emotion of another only in so far as the essence of one differs from the essence of another 124

Note 125

LⅧ．Besides pleasure and desire which are passions，there are other emotions of pleasure and pain which refer to us in so far as we are active 125

LⅨ．Among all the emotions which have reference to the mind，in so far as it is active，there are none which have not reference to pleasure or desire 126

Note 126

DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS 128

Ⅰ．Desire (cupiditas) 128

Ⅱ．Pleasure (laetitia) 128

Ⅲ．Pain (tristitia) 128

Ⅳ．Wonder (admiratio) 129

Ⅴ．Contempt 130

Ⅵ．Love (amor) 130

Ⅶ．Hatred (odium) 130

Ⅷ．Inclination (propensio) 130

Ⅸ．Aversion (aversio) 130

Ⅹ．Devotion (devotio) 131

Ⅺ．Derision (irrisio) 131

Ⅻ．Hope (spes) 131

ⅩⅢ．Fear (metus) 131

ⅩⅣ．Confidence (securitas) 131

ⅩⅤ．Despair (desperatio)． 131

ⅩⅥ．Joy (gaudium) 132

ⅩⅦ．Disappointment (conscientiae morsus) 132

ⅩⅧ．Pity (commiseratio) 132

ⅩⅨ．Favour (favor) 132

ⅩⅩ．Indignation (indignatio) 132

ⅩⅪ．Partiality (existimatio) 133

ⅩⅫ．Disparagement (despectus) 133

ⅩⅩⅢ．Envy (invidia) 133

ⅩⅩⅣ．Compassion (misericordia) 133

ⅩⅩⅤ．Self-complacency (acquiescentia in seipso) 133

ⅩⅩⅥ．Humility (humilitas) 133

ⅩⅩⅦ．Repentance (pcenitentia) 133

ⅩⅩⅧ．Pride (superbia) 134

ⅩⅩⅨ．Self-despising or dejection (abjectio) 135

ⅩⅩⅩ．Honour or glory (gloria) 135

ⅩⅩⅪ．Shame (pudor) 135

ⅩⅩⅫ．Regret (desiderium) 136

ⅩⅩⅩⅢ．Emulation (aemulatio) 136

ⅩⅩⅩⅣ．Gratefulness or gratitude (gratia seu gratitudo) 137

ⅩⅩⅩⅤ．Benevolence (benevolentia) 137

ⅩⅩⅩⅥ．Anger (ira) 137

ⅩⅩⅩⅦ．Vengeance (vindicta) 137

ⅩⅩⅩⅧ．Cruelty or savageness (crudelitas seu soevitas) 137

ⅩⅩⅩⅨ．Timidity (timor) 137

ⅩL．Daring (audacia) 137

ⅩLⅠ．Cowardice (pusillanimitas) 137

ⅩLⅡ．Consternation (consternatio) 138

ⅩLⅢ．Politeness or modesty (humanitas seu modestia) 138

ⅩLⅣ．Ambition (ambitio) 138

ⅩLⅤ．Luxury (luxuria) 138

ⅩLⅥ．Drunkenness (ebrietas) 138

ⅩLⅦ．Avarice (avaritia) 138

ⅩLⅧ．Lust (libido) 138

GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS 139

PART Ⅳ ON HUMAN SERVITUDE，OR THE STRENGTH OP THE EMOTIONS 141

PREFACE 141

DEFINITIONS 145

Ⅰ．Good (bonum) 144

Ⅱ．Bad (malum) 144

Ⅲ．Contingent individual things (contingentes) 144

Ⅳ．Possible individual things (possibiles) 144

Ⅴ．Contrary Emotions (affectus contrarii) 144

Ⅵ．Emotion towards a thing future，present，or past 144

Ⅶ．End (finis) 145

Ⅷ．Virtue (virtus) 145

AXIOM 145

PROPOSITIONS 145

Ⅰ．Nothing positive，which a false idea has，Is removed from the presence of what is true in so far as it is true 145

Note 145

Ⅱ．We are passive in so far as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without others 146

Ⅲ．The force with which man persists in existing is limited，and is far surpassed by the power of external causes 146

Ⅳ．It cannot happen that a man should not be a part of nature，and that he should be able not to suffer changes，save those which can be understood through his nature alone，and of which he is the adequate cause 147

Corollary 148

Ⅴ．The force and increase of any passion，and its persistence in existing，are not defined by the power whereby we endeavour to persist in existing，but by the power of an external cause compared with our own 148

Ⅵ．The force of any passion or emotion can so surpass the rest of the actions or the power of a man that the emotion adheres obstinately to him 148

Ⅶ．An emotion can neither be hindered nor removed save by a contrary emotion and one stronger in checking emotion 148

Corollary 149

Ⅷ．The knowledge of good or evil is nothing else than the emotion of pleasure or pain，in so far as we are conscious of it 149

Ⅸ．An emotion whose cause we imagine to be with us at the present is stronger than if we did not imagine it to be present 149

Note 150

Corollary 150

Ⅹ．Towards a future thing which we imagine to be close at hand we are more intensely affected than if we imagine the time of its existing to be further distant from the present；and by the recollection of a thing which we imagine to have passed not long ago we are more intensely affected also than if we imagine it to have passed long ago 150

Note 151

Ⅺ．The emotion towards a thing which we imagine to be necessary is more intense，coeteris paribus，than towards a thing possible，contingent，or not necessary 151

Ⅻ．The emotion towards a thing which we know to be non existent at the present time，and which we imagine possible，is more intense，coeteris paribus，than that towards a thing contingent 151

Corollary 151

ⅩⅢ．Emotion towards a thing contingent，which we know does not exist in the present，is far more mild，coeteris paribus，than emotion towards a thing past 152

ⅩⅣ．A true knowledge of good and evil cannot restrain any emotion in so far as the knowledge is true，but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion 152

ⅩⅤ．Desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil can be destroyed or checked by many other desires which arise from emotions by which we are assailed 152

ⅩⅥ．The desire which arises from the knowledge of good and evil，in so far as this knowledge has reference to the future，can more easily be checked or destroyed than the desire of things which are pleasing in the present 153

ⅩⅦ．Desire which arises from true knowledge of good and evil，in so far as this concerns things contingent，can be far more easily restrained than the desire for things which are present 153

Note 153

ⅩⅧ．Desire which arises from pleasure is stronger，coeteris paribus，than the desire which arises from pain 154

Note 154

ⅩⅨ．Each one necessarily desires or turns from，by the laws of his nature，what he thinks to be good or evil 156

ⅩⅩ．The more each one seeks what is useful to him，that is，the more he endeavours and can preserve his being，the more he is endowed with virtue；and，on the contrary，the more one neglects to preserve what is useful，or his being，he is thus far impotent or powerless 156

Note 156

ⅩⅪ．No one can desire to be blessed，to act well，or live well，who at the same time does not desire to be，to act，and to live，that is，actually to exist 157

ⅩⅫ．No virtue can be conceived as prior to this virtue of endeavouring to preserve oneself 157

Corollary 157

ⅩⅩⅢ．Man，in so far as he is determined to do anything，by the fact that he has inadequate ideas cannot absolutely be said to act from virtue，but only in so far as he is determined by the fact that he understands 157

ⅩⅩⅣ．To act absolutely according to virtue is nothing else in us than to act under the guidance of reason，to live so，and to preserve one＇s being (these three have the same meaning) on the basis of seeking what is useful to oneself 158

ⅩⅩⅤ．No one endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of anything else 158

ⅩⅩⅥ．Whatever we endeavour to do under the guidance of reason is nothing else than to understand；nor does the mind，in so far as it uses reason，judge anything useful to itself save what is conducive to understanding 158

ⅩⅩⅦ．We know nothing to be certainly good or evil save what is truly conducive to understanding or what pre vents us from understanding 159

ⅩⅩⅧ．The greatest good of the mind is the knowledge of God，and the greatest virtue of the mind is to know God 159

ⅩⅩⅨ．Any individual thing whose nature is altogether different to ours can aid or hinder our power of under standing，and absolutely nothing can be either good or bad save if it have something in common with us 160

ⅩⅩⅩ．Nothing can be bad through that which it has in common with our nature；but in so far as it is bad，thus far it is contrary to us 160

ⅩⅩⅪ．In so far as anything agrees with our nature，thus far it is necessarily good 161

Corollary 161

ⅩⅩⅫ．In so far as men are liable to passions they cannot thus far be said to agree in nature 161

Note 161

ⅩⅩⅩⅢ．Men can differ in nature in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions，and thus far one and the same man is variable and inconstant 162

ⅩⅩⅩⅣ．Men，in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions，can be contrary one to the other 162

Note 162

ⅩⅩⅩⅤ．In so far as men live under the guidance of reason，thus far only they always necessarily agree in nature 163

Corollaries 164

Note 164

ⅩⅩⅩⅥ．The greatest good of those who follow virtue is common to all，and all can equally enjoy it 165

Note 165

ⅩⅩⅩⅦ．The good which each one who follows virtue desires for himself，he also desires for other men，and the more so the more knowledge he has of God 165

Notes 166

ⅩⅩⅩⅧ．That is useful to man which so disposes the human body that it can be affected in many modes，or which renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many modes，and the more so according as it readers the body more apt to be affected in many modes or to affect other bodies so；and，on the contrary，that is harmful (noxius) to man which renders the body less apt for this 169

ⅩⅩⅩⅨ．Whatever brings it to pass that the proportion of motion and rest which the parts of the human body hold one to the other is preserved，is good；and contrariwise，that is bad which brings it about that the parts of the human body have another proportion mutually of motion and rest 169

Note 170

ⅩL．Whatever is conducive of the common society of men，or whatever brings it about that men live together in peace and agreement，is useful，and，on the contrary，that is bad which induces discord in the state 171

ⅩLⅠ．Pleasure clearly is not evil but good；but pain，on the contrary，is clearly evil 171

ⅩLⅡ．There cannot be too much merriment，but it is always good；but，on the other hand，melancholy is always bad 171

ⅩLⅢ．Titillation can be excessive and be bad；but grief may be good in so far as titillation or pleasure is bad 171

ⅩLⅣ．Love and desire can be excessive 172

Note 172

ⅩLⅤ．Hatred can never be good 173

Notes 173

Corollaries 173

ⅩLⅥ．He who lives under the guidance of reason endeavours as much as possible to repay his fellow＇s hatred，rage，contempt，etc．，with love and nobleness 174

Note 174

ⅩLⅦ．The emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves good 175

Note 175

ⅩLⅧ．The emotions of partiality and disparagement are always bad 175

ⅩLⅨ．Partiality easily renders the man who is over-estimated，proud 175

L．Pity in a man who lives under the guidance of reason is in itself bad and useless 175

Corollary 176

Note 176

LⅠ．Favour is not opposed to reason，but can agree with it and arise from it 176

Mote 176

LⅡ．Self-complacency can arise from reason，and that self-complacency which arises from reason alone is the greatest 177

Note 177

LⅢ．Humility is not a virtue if it does not arise from reason 177 LIV．Repentance is not a virtue，or，in other words，it does not arise from reason，but he who repents of an action is twice as unhappy or as weak as before 178

LⅣ．Repentance is not a virtue，or，in other words，it does not arise from reason，but he who repents of an action is twice as unhappy or as weak as before 178

Note 178

LⅤ．The greatest pride or dejection is the greatest ignorance of self 178

LⅥ．The greatest pride or dejection indicates the greatest weakness of mind 178

Corollary 179

Note 179

LⅦ．A proud man loves the presence of parasites or flatterers，but the presence of noble people he hates 179

Note 179

LⅧ．Honour is not opposed to reason，but can arise from it 180

Note 180

LⅨ．For all actions for which we are determined by an emotion which is a passion we can be determined without that emotion by reason alone 181

Note 182

LⅩ．Desire which arises from pleasure or pain which has reference to one or certain parts of the body has no advantage to man as a whole 183

Note 183

LⅪ．Desire which arises from reason can have no excess 183

LⅫ．In so far as the mind conceives a thing according to the dictate of reason，it will be equally affected whether the idea be of a thing present，past，or future 184

Note 184

LⅩⅢ．He that is led by fear to do good in order to avoid evil is not led by reason 184

Notes 185

Corollary 185

LⅩⅣ．The knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge 185

Corollary 186

LⅩⅤ．Under the guidance of reason we follow the greater of two things which are good and the lesser of two things which are evil 186

Corollary 186

LⅩⅥ．Under the guidance of reason we desire a greater future good before a lesser present one，and a lesser evil in the present＂before a greater in the future＂(Van Vloten＇s version) 186

Corollary 186

Note 186

LⅩⅦ．A free man thinks of nothing less than of death，and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life 187

LⅩⅧ．If men were born free they would form no conception of good and evil as long as they were free 187

Note 187

LⅩⅨ．The virtue of a free man appears equally great in refusing to face difficulties as in overcoming them 188

Corollary 188

Note 188

LⅩⅩ．A free man who lives among ignorant people tries as much as he can to refuse their benefits 188

Note 189

LⅩⅪ．Only free men are truly grateful one to the other 189

Note 189

LⅩⅫ．A free man never acts by fraud，but always with good faith 189

Note 190

LⅩⅩⅢ．A man who is guided by reason is more free in a state where he lives according to common law than in solitude where he is subject to no law 190

Note 190

APPENDIX 191

PART Ⅴ CONCERNING THE POWER OF THE INTELLECT OR HUMAN FREEDOM 199

PREFACE 199

AXIOMS Ⅰ．，Ⅱ． 202

PROPOSITIONS 202

Ⅰ．Just as thoughts and the ideas of the mind are arranged and connected in the mind，so in the body its modifications or the modifications of things are arranged and connected according to their order 202

Ⅱ．If we remove disturbance of the mind or emotion from the thought of an external cause and unite it to other thoughts，then love or hatred towards the external cause，as well as waverings of the mind which arise from these emotions，are destroyed 202

Ⅲ．An emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it 203

Corollary 203

Ⅳ．There is no modification of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct conception 203

Corollary 203

Note 203

Ⅴ．Emotion towards a thing which we imagine simply and not as necessary nor possible nor contingent is，coeteris paribus，the greatest of all 204

Ⅵ．In so far as the mind understands all things as necessary it has more power over the emotions or is less passive to them 205

Note 205

Ⅶ．Emotions which arise or are excited by reason，if we regard time，are greater than those which are referred to individual things which we regard as absent 205

Ⅷ．The more an emotion is excited by many emotions concurring at the same time，the greater it will be 206

Note 206

Ⅸ．Emotion which has reference to many different causes which the mind regards at the same time as the emotion itself is less harmful，and we are less passive to it and less affected toward each cause than another emotion equally great which has reference to one alone or fewer causes 206

Ⅹ．As long as we are not assailed by emotions which are contrary to our nature we are able to arrange and connect the modifications of the body according to their intellectual order 206

Note 207

Ⅺ．The more any image has reference to many things，the more frequent it is，the more often it nourishes，and the more it occupies the mind 209

Ⅻ．The images of things are more easily joined to images which have reference to things which we understand clearly and distinctly than to others 209

ⅩⅢ．The more an image is associated with many other things，the more often it flourishes 209

ⅩⅣ．The mind can bring it to pass that all the modifications of the body or images of things have reference to the idea of God 209

ⅩⅤ．He who understands himself and his emotions loves God，and the more so the more he understands himself and his emotions 209

ⅩⅥ．This love towards God must occupy the mind chiefly 210

ⅩⅦ．God is free from passions，nor is he affected with any emotion of pleasure or pain 210

Corollary 210

ⅩⅧ．No one can hate God 210

Corollary 210

Note 210

ⅩⅨ．He who loves God cannot endeavour to bring it about that God should love him in return 211

ⅩⅩ．This love towards God cannot be polluted by an emotion either of envy or jealousy，but it is cherished the more，the more we imagine men to be bound to God by this bond of love 211

Note 211

ⅩⅪ．The mind can imagine nothing nor recollect past things save while in the body 213

ⅩⅫ．In God，however，there is necessarily granted the idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the species of eternity 213

ⅩⅩⅢ．The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the human body，but there is some part of it that remains eternal 213

Note 214

ⅩⅩⅣ．The more we understand individual things，the more we understand God 214

ⅩⅩⅤ．The greatest endeavour of the mind and its greatest virtue is to understand things by the third class of knowledge 214

ⅩⅩⅥ．The more apt the mind is to understand things by the third class of knowledge，the more it desires to understand things by this class of knowledge 215

ⅩⅩⅦ．From this third class of knowledge the greatest possible mental satisfaction arises 215

ⅩⅩⅧ．The endeavour or desire of knowing things accord ing to the third class of knowledge cannot arise from the first but the second class of knowledge 215

ⅩⅩⅨ．Whatever the mind understands under the species of eternity it does not understand owing to the fact that it conceives the actual present existence of the body，but owing to the fact that it conceives the essence of the body under the species of eternity 216

Note 216

ⅩⅩⅩ．The human mind in so far as it knows itself and its body under the species of eternity，thus far it necessarily has knowledge of God，and knows that it exists in God and is conceived through God 216

ⅩⅩⅪ．The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as its formal cause in so far as the mind is eternal 217

Note 217

ⅩⅩⅫ．Whatever we understand according to the third class of knowledge we are pleased with，and that accom panied with the idea of God as the cause 217

Corollary 218

ⅩⅩⅩⅢ．The intellectual love towards God which arises from the third kind of knowledge is eternal 218

Note 218

ⅩⅩⅩⅣ．The mind is only liable to emotions which are referred to passions while the body lasts 218

Corollary 218

Note 218

ⅩⅩⅩⅤ．God loves himself with infinite intellectual love 219

ⅩⅩⅩⅥ．The mental intellectual love towards God is the very love of God with which God loves himself，not in so far as he is infinite，but in so far as he can be expressed through the essence of the human mind considered under the species of eternity，that is，mental intellectual love towards God is part of the infinite love with which God loves himself 219

Corollary 219

Note 219

ⅩⅩⅩⅦ．There is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual love or which can remove it 220

Note 220

ⅩⅩⅩⅧ．The more the mind understands things by the second and third kinds of knowledge，the less it will be passive to emotions which are evil，and the less it will fear death 220

Note 221

ⅩⅩⅩⅨ．He who has a body capable of many things，has a mind of which the greater part is eternal 221

Note 221

ⅩL．The more perfection anything has，the more active and the less passive it is；and contrariwise，the more active it is，the more perfect it becomes 222

Corollary 222

Note 222

ⅩLⅠ．Although we did not know that our mind is eternal，we would hold before all things piety and religion，and absolutely all things which we have shown in Part IV．to have reference to courage and nobility 223

Note 223

ⅩLⅡ．Blessedness is not the reward of virtue，but virtue itself：nor should we rejoice in it for that we restrain our lusts，but，on the contrary，because we rejoice therein we can restrain our lusts 223

Note 224

TREATISE ON THE CORRECTION OF THE UNDERSTANDING 227

Ⅰ．On the Good Things which Men desire for the most Part 227

Ⅱ．On the True and Supreme Good 229

Ⅲ．Certain Rules of Life 231

Ⅳ．On the Four Modes of Perception 232

Ⅴ．On the Best Mode of Perception 234

Ⅵ．On the Instruments of the Understanding，True Ideas 235

Ⅶ．On the Right Method of Knowing 237

Ⅷ．First Part of the Method－On Fictitious Ideas 241

Ⅸ．On the False Idea 248

Ⅹ．On the Doubtful Idea 252

Ⅺ．On Memory and Forgetfulness－Conclusion 253

Ⅻ．Second Part of the Method－On Double Perception 256

ⅩⅢ．On the Conditions of Definition 258

ⅩⅣ．Of the Means by which Eternal Things are known 259

ⅩⅤ．On the Power of the Understanding and its Properties 261